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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Poking the Bear or Waking the Sleeping Beauty? The Potential of Fundamental Rights Complaint Procedures Before the CJEU

verfasst von : Daniel Krotov, Frederic Kupsch

Erschienen in: On the Relation between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and National Fundamental Rights

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

The idea of an individual fundamental rights complaint before the CJEU is not new, but the respective discussions have fallen silent after the failure to adopt the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005. However, after constitutional courts in several Member States have claimed the right to interpret the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the formerly ebbing discussions are slowly getting louder again. This self-empowerment could be perceived as an attempt to obtain the predominant influence on the interpretation of the Charter. Strengthening individual legal action before the CJEU seems as an appropriate response to help maintain the delicate balance of power between national courts and the Luxembourg Court. These thoughts leads us to the following questions: Is the procedural law of the EU in need of a reform? What should such a reform look like? Do the Member States refuse their citizens elementary procedural guarantees to enforce their EU fundamental rights before an EU court—or are there justified concerns to limit the scope of individual action before the CJEU? Would major reforms awaken the sleeping potential of the Court or unleash forces beyond the control of its creators?

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Vorheriges Kapitel Sweden, Fundamental Rights and the EU Charter

See, inter alia, Rengeling (1995), p. 1187 et seq.; Reich (2000), p. 375 et seq.; Schwarze (2002), p. 1297 et seq.; Mayer (2004), p. 606 et seq.

For examples of national court decisions see the previous chapters; the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will be subsequently referred to as the Charter.

Dare more progress: Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Sustainability, Coalition agreement 2021–2025 between the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), Alliance 90/The Greens and the Free Democrats (FDP), p. 132.

Cf. von Schirach (2021), p. 19: Art. 6 – “Grundrechtsklage”: “Jeder Mensch kann wegen systematischer Verletzungen dieser Charta Grundrechtsklage vor den Europäischen Gerichten erheben.”

Historically, however, this might as well have been different, as shown by political deliberations and draft treaties, see, e.g., Rengeling (1995), p. 1190 et seq.; in particular we want to highlight the Letter of the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans to the European Council of 29 December 1975, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 1/76, p. 27 (“individuals will have the right of direct appeal to the Court of Justice against an act of an institution in violation of these fundamental rights.”) as well as Art. 38 of the European Parliament Resolution on the Constitution of the European Union of 10 February 1994, 1994/C 61/155, p. 164 (“The Court of Justice shall be competent to rule any action brought by an individual seeking to establish that the Union has violated a human right guaranteed by the Convention.”).

CJEU, judgment of 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost/Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, C-314/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, para. 15.

This, however, creates problems on its own, as the individual might be required to violate execution and/or implementation measures in the first place to obtain an implicit fundamental rights review of the respective secondary legislative act by national courts leading to the eventual referral.

Calliess (2022), p. 26; such a situation arose, e.g., in the case CJEU, judgment of 1 April 2004, Commission/Jégo-Quéré, C-263/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:210.

See, e.g., the arguments brought by the applicants in CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, as pointed out by the opinion of AG Jacobs of 21 March 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197, para. 36.

Dauses (2008), p. 449; the preliminary ruling procedure only grants indirect individual protection; underlining this subjective dimension of proceedings see, e.g., Silveira and Perez Fernandes (2016), p. 635 et seq.; Ehricke (2018), Art. 267 AEUV, para. 8 with further references.

Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings of 8 November 2019, 2019/C 380/01, para. 1.

See already, e.g., CJEU, judgment of 11 January 2000, Tanja Kreil/Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-285/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:2 leading to an amendment of the German Basic Law that allowed women to become equal members of the armed forces.

Rengeling (1995), p. 1195.

E.g., legislative acts, acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.

See, e.g., CJEU, judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann/Commission of the EEC, C-25/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17; CJEU, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others/Parliament and Council, C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, para. 57 et seq., 71.

Cf. CJEU, judgment of 19 November 1991, Francovich and Bonifaci/Italy, C-6/90 and C-9/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428. It is true that the national court can again ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, but the same defects mentioned above would be present.

Dauses (2008), p. 449; Rengeling (1995), p. 1194.

CJEU, judgment of 30 September 2003, Köbler/Austria, C-224/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:513, para. 53; CJEU, judgment of 13 June 2006, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA/Italy, C-173/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:391, para. 42 (emphasis added).

It allows the individual to challenge an act of the EU during a procedure before the CJEU, for example an action of annulment, to which they are party.

See, e.g., complaints to the European Ombudsman about maladministration of EU institutions which includes violations of EU law, the principle of good administration, or human rights, https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/make-a-complaint. Accessed 18 Jan 2024. However, the procedure grants no effective fundamental rights protection to the individual, as it lies within the discretion of the Ombudsman to open an inquiry into a matter. The Ombudsman’s competences are limited to issuing recommendations to the EU institutions. See for further procedures Heselhaus (2020), pp. 319–336.

See, e.g., the individual application (Art. 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECHR) before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). However, as long as the EU is not a party to the Convention, acts of the EU cannot be as such subject to an application before the ECtHR. Additionally, the ECtHR has limited its scope of review in the interest of international cooperation by using “the presumption […] that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation.” In the same judgment, the ECtHR confirmed that the fundamental rights protection of the EU is equivalent to that under the ECHR. The presumption can only be rebutted if the ECtHR holds that the protection of Convention rights was “manifestly deficient”, see ECtHR (GC), judgment of 30 June 2005, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Appl. No. 45036/98, para. 156, 165.

“The Commission is not a judicial body or a court of appeal against the decisions of national or international courts. Nor does it, as a matter of principle, examine the merits of an individual case, except if this is relevant to carry out its task of ensuring that the Member States apply EU law correctly. In particular, if it detects a wider, e.g., structural, problem, the Commission can contact the national authorities to have it solved, and ultimately it can take a Member State to the CJEU.” European Commission, 2015 report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2016, p. 21.

Pache (2020), para. 93.

Lenaerts (2022). However, this qualification seems not to have found its way into the printed version. In stark contrast, a CJEU-driven “over-constitutionalisation” is a frequently voiced complaint on the national level, see, e.g., Grimm (2015).

CJEU, judgment of 13 May 1981, SpA International Chemical Corporation/Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato, C-66/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:102, para. 11; CJEU, judgment of 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost/Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, C-314/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, para. 15.

CJEU, judgment of 5 March 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft/Federal Republic of Germany, 69/85, ECLI:EU:C:1986:104, para. 13; this role was also stressed by Commission President von der Leyen with regard to the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (FCC) judgment in the Weiss case: “The final word on EU law is always spoken in Luxembourg. Nowhere else.”, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_846. Accessed 18 Jan 2024; on this judgment see Mayer (2020), p. 733.

Cf. Thym (2015), p. 58.

The Venice Commission also stresses that a supreme court should not “supervise” the lower courts, see Venice Commission, opinion on the draft Constitution of the Nakhichevan autonomous republic (Azerbaijan Republic) of 18 December 1997, CDL-INF(1997)006-e, para. 6.

Pache (2020), para. 11 et seq.

CJEU, judgment of 9 March 1978, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato/Simmenthal, C-106/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, para. 16.

Opinion of AG Jacobs of 21 March 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197, para. 41; see also Pache (2020), para. 12; it is wrong to state that national courts are “not per se competent to implement EU law”, Wegner (2008), p. 58.

See Art. 4 para. 3 TEU; on the fundamental primary law principle of “mutual trust” see Lenaerts (2017), p. 812 et seq.; with regard to the ECHR system cf. Nußberger (2020), p. 111.

Cf. also from a national (German and French) point of view Krotov (2022), p. 215 et seq.

This particular problem has already been pointed out by the former President of the Federal German Constitutional Court Papier (2004), p. 5; see also Rengeling (1995), p. 1194.

Sarmiento (2013), p. 1267 aptly describes the relationship of the CJEU and national constitutional courts as an “illusion of unilateral supremacy” on both sides.

The national identity, also referred to by Art. 4 para. 2 TEU, has developed into the focal point of the national constitutional jurisdictions, see Wetz (2021).

On the legitimacy of the CJEU in general see Clausen (2020), p. 249 et seq.

This term was invented by Boudin (1911) and popularised in France and beyond by Lambert (1921).

Thibaudeau (1795), p. 1332.

Cf., e.g., Theresa May’s emblematic Lancaster House speech of 17 January 2017: “So we will take back control of our laws and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain. Leaving the European Union will mean that our laws will be made in Westminster, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. And those laws will be interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg but in courts across this country”, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech. Accessed 18 Jan 2024.

Rengeling (1995), p. 1204, however, argues that strengthening the CJEU in fundamental rights could lead to the emergence of a European “constitutional patriotism”—a very German perspective that is not necessarily shared in other countries.

Despite some isolated incidents, the general assessment of the cooperation between the CJEU and the national courts is overwhelmingly positive, see, e.g., Lenaerts (2015), p. 3 et seq.; Voßkuhle (2010).

A similar reasoning exists in France regarding the Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité procedure where ordinary courts decide without the possibility of appeal on transferring the (preliminary) question of constitutionality to the Constitutional Council.

This term is taken from Breuer (2019), p. 3 et seq.

Opinion of AG Jacobs of 21 March 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197, para. 40 et seq.; similarly GCEU, judgment of 3 May 2002, Jégo-Quéré/Commission, T-177/01, ECLI:EU:T:2002:112, para. 39 et seq., the decision was later annulled by CJEU, judgment of 1 April 2004, Commission/Jégo-Quéré, C-263/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:210; see also Pache (2020), para. 12; Rengeling (1995), p. 1194 et seq., 1201.

CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, para. 41 et seq., 44; CJEU, judgment of 1 April 2004, Commission/Jégo-Quéré, C-263/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:210, para. 36; CJEU, judgment of 27 February 2007, Segi and Others/Council, C-355/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:116, para. 56; CJEU, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others/Parliament and Council, C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, para. 100 et seq.; opinion of AG Kokott of 17 January 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others/Parliament and Council, C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:21, para. 121.

In this direction Kämmerer and Kotzur (2020), p. 182.

Cf. Pache (2020), para. 41.

CJEU, judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann/Commission of the EEC, C-25/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17.

Opinion of AG Jacobs of 10 July 2003, Commission/Jégo-Quéré, C-263/02, ECLI:EU:C:2003:410, para. 43; Pache (2004), p. 201.

CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, para. 34 et seq.; CJEU, judgment of 1 April 2004, Commission/Jégo-Quéré, C-263/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:210, para. 38. The General Court had defined the notion of “individual concern” in this case (para. 37) as follows: “[A] natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of general application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him.” Already the opinion of AG Jacobs of 21 March 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197, para. 60 proposed a narrower definition “that a person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests.”

Dauses (2011), p. 121.

CJEU, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others/Parliament and Council, C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, para. 60 et seq., where the CJEU defines the notion of a “regulatory act” as only covering acts of general application others than legislative acts; Cremer (2022), para. 71 defends the findings and the reasoning of the CJEU.

See, e.g., Pache (2020), para. 63 et seq. with further references.

CJEU, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others/Parliament and Council, C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, para. 57 et seq.

Pache (2020), para. 90; cf. also Wegner (2008), p. 53 et seq.

The average length of proceedings amounted to 17.2 months in 2021 compared to 15.4 months in 2020 and 15.6 months in 2019, see CJEU, Annual Report 2021, p. 30; CJEU, Annual Report 2020, p. 24; CJEU, Annual Report 2019, p. 26. However, one must acknowledge that the duration decreased significantly during the last twenty years as the average duration amounted in 2002 to 24.1 months.

See Art. 267 para. 4 TFEU and Art. 23a of the Statute of the CJEU.

For a critical overview see Pache (2004), p. 209 et seq.

Draft amendment to Protocol No. 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, presented by the Court of Justice on 30 November 2022, 2022/0906(COD). The draft amendment was also favourably perceived by the European Commission in its opinion on the draft amendment from 14 March 2023, COM(2023) 135 final/2 and passed the trilogue negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament, see press statement from 7 December 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/07/reform-of-the-statute-of-the-court-of-justice-council-and-parliament-negotiators-reach-provisional-agreement/. Accessed 18 Jan 2024.

Cf. the aforementioned section in European Commission, 2015 report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2016, p. 21.

For the first time see CJEU, judgment of 4 October 2018, Commission v. France, C-416/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:811; for the second time in the Weiss case in 2020, where proceedings were dropped by the Commission before the CJEU had a chance to decide in the matter, cf. European Commission, decision of 2 February 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_21_6201. Accessed 18 Jan 2024.

On this whole topic see Haltern (2017), p. 67 et seq.

See Pech (2020).

Schwarze (2002), p. 1313; arguing in favour of a possible more extensive interpretation, yet demanding an amendment of the Treaties, Pache (2004), p. 204.

CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, para. 40.

CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, para. 41; CJEU, order of 10 October 2017, Greenpeace Energy/Commission, C-640/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2017:752, para. 63.

CJEU, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, para. 45.

Especially the failed draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, cf. on this subject Mayer (2004), p. 606 et seq.; see also Rengeling (1995), p. 1190 et seq.

Harlow (1992), p. 246; Schwarze (2002), pp. 1308, 1310 et seq.; Pache (2020), para. 95; Rudolf (2011), p. 156.

Schwarze (2002), p. 1311; differently Pache (2020), para. 95.

The important surge of cases following the entry into force of the 11th additional protocol to the ECHR leading to a major back log was successfully mitigated, albeit over a long period of time. On the current case-processing system of the ECtHR see the Press Release no. ECHR 092 (2021) of 17 March 2021, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-6966913-9378085&filename=ECHR%20launches%20new%20case-processing%20strategy.pdf. Accessed 18 Jan 2024.

In the same manner Rengeling (1995), p. 1196; differently Schwarze (2002), p. 1307 et seq.

Letter of Leo Tindemans to the European Council, 29 December 1975, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 1/76, para. 32; for examples of even earlier doctrinal criticism see Schwarze (2002), p. 1308.

This is the assessment of Wegner (2008), p. 48; Schwarze (2002), p. 1312; see also Dauses (1994), p. D 138 et seq.; Reich (2000), p. 377 with further references.

Most notably Reich (2000), p. 378; Schwarze (2002), pp. 1310, 1313 et seq.; Dauses (2008), p. 449 et seq.; for older proposals see Rengeling (1995), p. 1191 et seq. with further references.

Reich (2000), p. 377 et seq. also shows alternatives: the CJEU could pick and choose cases similarly to the certiorari procedure before the US Supreme Court. The Due-Report of 19 January 2000, however, rejected the US-style filtering system as creating a too severe hierarchy between national courts and the CJEU, see Working Party of the European Commission (2001), p. 171. Another possibility is a de minimis rule allowing the CJEU to easily reject simple cases. See also the favourable opinion of the Working Party of the European Commission (2001), p. 167 et seq.

Reich (2000), p. 378; Wegner (2008), p. 51 et seq. refers to Art. 35 ECHR and similar provisions in the German legislation regarding the Federal Constitutional Court; Rengeling (1995), p. 1197.

This, however, cannot be said for a fundamental rights complaint procedure against national measures allowing the CJEU to annul national courts’ decisions, see below.

Opinion of AG Jacobs of 21 March 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197, para. 42.

Opinion of AG Jacobs of 21 March 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores/Council, C-50/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197, para. 59 et seq.; on this topic see above.

For Germany see Kämmerer and Kotzur (2020), p. 182 et seq.; Calliess (2021), p. 17.

Rengeling (1995), p. 1198.

One could also refer to the declaratory action that is already well-established in the administrative procedural law of the countries of the EU, cf. Mayer (2004), p. 613.

Cf., e.g., ECtHR (Plenary), judgment of 25 August 1987, Englert v. Germany, Appl. No. 10282/83, para. 32; ECmHR, decision of 7 October 1980, X v. Germany, Appl. No. 8499/79.

Reich (2000), p. 378.

ECtHR (GC), judgment of 30 June 2005, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Appl. No. 45036/98.

For a recent illustration of the “last word” of the Strasbourg Court see ECtHR, judgment of 6 December 2022, Spasov v. Romania, Appl. No. 27122/14.

In more detail see below.

Affirmative Rengeling (1995), p. 1206 et seq.; differently Dauses (1994), p. D 141 et seq. who perceives the accession of the EC (today EU) to the ECHR as sufficient by itself.

Schwarze (2002), p. 1311; Pache (2020), para. 92; Wegner (2008), p. 53 et seq.

This and the following thoughts were already expressed in a similar way by Schwarze (2002), p. 1311 et seq.

Explicitly ECtHR, judgment of 6 December 2022, Spasov v. Romania, Appl. No. 27122/14, para. 82, 83 with further references.

On both procedures Wegner (2008), p. 55 et seq.

Affirmative also Wegner (2008), p. 58; differently Pache (2020), para. 100.

Cf. Rengeling (1995), p. 1198; Dauses (1994), p. D 141.

Schwarze (2002), p. 1312.

Schröder (2011), p. 827.

Cf. CJEU, judgment of 6 October 1982, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA/Ministero della Sanità, C-283/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, para. 21.

100

Schwarze (2002), p. 1314.

101

Fervently Pache (2020), para. 95 who therefore considers this procedure to be “alien to the [EU procedural] system and inappropriate”; similarly, the German CJEU judge von Danwitz (2013), p. 46; Mayer (2004), p. 613.

102

Cf. on the reduction of the CJEU’s authority as a fundamental rights court by the German FCC’s Recht auf Vergessen II judgment Burchardt (2020), p. 12 et seq.; similarly, Kämmerer and Kotzur (2020), p. 183; Calliess (2021), pp. 21, 24 et seq. who both stress the “danger of a nationalisation of the fundamental rights protection” (Kämmerer and Kotzur); the same can be said with regard to all similar constitutional courts decisions.

103

Wegner (2008), p. 58 goes even further claiming that individual protection creates acceptance of the supremacy of a judiciary which national constitutional courts and the ECtHR already have.

104

Rengeling (1995), p. 1120; Schwarze (2002), p. 1312.

105

Differently Pache (2004), p. 225; Pache (2020), para. 95.

106

E.g., inter alia, Vondung (2012); Kosta et al. (2014).

107

CJEU, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.

108

Rosas (2022), p. 207.

109

Cf. Art. 52 para. 3, 53 of the Charter.

110

Toth (1997), p. 504 et seq.

111

ECtHR, judgment of 6 December 2022, Spasov v. Romania, Appl. No. 27122/14, para. 97.

112

Already pointing to the risk of interpretation of EU law by the ECtHR Toth (1997), p. 503 et seq.

113

Pache (2020), para. 98.

114

Mayer (2004), p. 614.

115

This phrasing as well as the headline are partially inspired by the article written by Morijn (2014) asking in contrast to this article whether the Charter is a sleeping beauty whose potential for policy-makers has to be contained either on EU level or on national level.

116

Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_en. Accessed 18 Jan 2024.

117

Cf. almost literally Pache (2020), para. 99.

118

CJEU, judgment of 12 November 1969, Stauder/Stadt Ulm, C-29/69, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57.

119

Reich (2000), p. 378.

120

Pache (2020), para. 100.

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Titel: Poking the Bear or Waking the Sleeping Beauty? The Potential of Fundamental Rights Complaint Procedures Before the CJEU
verfasst von: Daniel Krotov
Frederic Kupsch
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Buch: On the Relation between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and National Fundamental Rights
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-52684-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-52685-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52685-5_11

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